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Abstract—Bitcoin’s single leader consensus protocol
(Nakamoto consensus) suffers from significant transaction
throughput and network scalability issues due to the
computational requirements of it Proof-of-Work (PoW)
based leader selection strategy. To overcome this, committee-
based approaches (e.g., Elastico) that partition the outstanding
transaction set into shards and (randomly) select multiple
committees to process these transactions in parallel have been
proposed and have become very popular. However, by design
these committee or shard-based blockchain solutions are easily
vulnerable to the Sybil attacks, where an adversary can easily
compromise/manipulate the consensus protocol if it has enough
computational power to generate multiple Sybil committee
members (by generating multiple valid node identifiers). Despite
the straightforward nature of these attacks, they have not been
systematically analyzed. In this paper, we fill this research gap
by modelling and analyzing Sybil attacks in a representative
and popular shard-based protocol called Elastico. We show
that the PoW technique used for identifier or ID generation in
the initial phase of the protocol is vulnerable to Sybil attacks,
and a node with high hash-power can generate enough Sybil
IDs to successfully compromise Elastico. We analytically derive
conditions for two different categories of Sybil attacks and
perform numerical simulations to validate our theoretical results
under different network and protocol parameters.
Index Terms—Shard-based Blockchain, Sybil Attack, Elastico.
I. INTRODUCTION
A blockchain is an append-only and immutable distributed
database or ledger that records a time-sequenced history of
transactions. One key aspect of the blockchain protocol is
the consensus algorithm which enables agreement among a
network of nodes or processors on the current state of the
ledger, assuming that some of them could be malicious or
faulty. Blockchain protocols are classified as permissioned or
permissionless depending on whether a trusted infrastructure
to establish verifiable identities for nodes is present or not.
One of the first, and still popular, permissionless blockchain
protocol is Bitcoin [1]. Consensus in Bitcoin is achieved by
selecting a leader node in an unbiased fashion once every 10
minutes (an epoch) on an average, who then gets the right
to append a new block onto the blockchain. The network
then implicitly accept this block by building on top of it in
the following epoch or reject it by building on top of some
other block. Bitcoin uses a Proof-of-Work (PoW) mechanism
to select the leader in each epoch. In Bitcoin’s PoW, each
node independently attempts to solve a hash puzzle and
the one that succeeds is selected as a leader who gets the
right to propose the next block. As PoW involves significant
computation, Bitcoin’s protocol includes a reward mechanism
for the winning node in order to incentivize everyone to
behave honestly. Ever since the introduction of Bitcoin in
2008, the power of permissionless blockchain technology has
been harnessed to create systems that can host and execute
distributed contracts (also referred to as “smart contracts”)
which have found many interesting applications, including,
cryptocurrencies, secure data sharing and digital copyright
management to name a few [2].
A significant shortcoming of Bitcoin’s (and of other similar
permissionless system’s) leader and PoW competition based
consensus protocol is its low transaction throughput and poor
network scalability. For instance, Bitcoin’s and Ethereum’s
transaction rates are only 7 and 20 transactions per sec-
ond, respectively, which is clearly not sufficient for practical
applications [3]. Although there have been several efforts
towards improving the Bitcoin protocol itself, for instance,
BIP [4] and Bitcoin-NG [5], other works have focused towards
developing alternate high throughput and scalable permission-
less blockchain protocols. One key outcome in this line of
research is committee or shard-based protocols [6]–[8] that
operate by periodically partitioning the network of nodes into
smaller non-overlapping committees, each of which processes
a disjoint set of transactions (also called, a shard) in parallel
with other committees. As each committee is reasonably small,
the transaction throughput and scalability can be significantly
improved by running a classical Byzantine consensus protocol
such as PBFT [9] within each committee (and in parallel
across all committees) rather than the traditional PoW based
competition as used in Bitcoin. The idea of parallelizing the
tasks of transaction processing and consensus by partitioning
the processor network into committees is very promising and
is already seeing deployment [10].
Committee participation in popular shard-based protocols
such as Elastico [6] happen by nodes generating verifiable
IDs using some pre-defined PoW puzzle at the beginning of
each epoch - only nodes that are able to generate valid IDs
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Fig. 1: A shard-based blockchain system model. Step 1: All nodes generate their IDs using a PoW defined mechanism. Step 2: IDs and
transactions will be distributed among shards, given the generated IDs. There exist 2s shards. Each shard accepts up to c IDs. Step 3: Each
shard runs a PBFT mechanism to validate the assigned transaction sets. At least τ IDs have to agree on the output of each shard. Step 4:
Final committee merges the agreed values of shards and create a final block, that will be added to blockchain. In this example, the attacker
breaks the consensus protocol in Shard 1 (i.e., BCP attack) and inserts fake transactions in the output of Shard k (i.e., GFT attack).
are able to participate in the consensus process in that epoch.
However, it should be easy to see that the ID generation
process easily lands itself to a Sybil attack. An adversary
(valid node in the network) can leverage its computational
or hash-power to generate a large number of Sybil IDs and
increase its participation in shards. The adversary, by means of
the generated Sybil IDs, can compromise the intra-committee
consensus protocol to either prevent new transaction blocks
from being added or to add fake transactions to the blockchain.
Existing shard-based protocols assume that all nodes have
the same hash-power, and thus the PoW based ID generation
mechanism with an appropriate difficulty is not prone to such
Sybil attacks. This assumption about the uniformity of hash-
power across nodes generally does not hold, making such
Sybil attacks feasible. Despite this, there has been very little
effort within the research community to analytically study and
combat the threat of Sybil attacks in shard-based blockchains.
In this paper, we attempt to address this research gap.
Specifically, we investigate two different types of Sybil
attacks in a representative shard-based blockchain system such
as Elastico: (i) Break Consensus Protocol (or BCP) attack
where the goal of the adversary is to thwart the consensus
process and (ii) Generate Fake Transaction (or GFT) attack
where the goal of the adversary is to introduce fake or invalid
transactions into the blockchain. By assuming a reasonable
network and adversary model, we first derive bounds on the
success probability of these attacks and then theoretically
analyze the necessary conditions to achieve success in these
attacks. We further validate our analytical results by means of
numerical simulations for a variety of system and network
parameters. These analytical results and simulations shed
further light on the computational or hash-power requirement
for an adversary to compromise the consensus protocol of
shard-based protocols and the choice of system and network
parameters that can significantly reduce the probability of such
attacks. The remainder of this paper is structured as follows.
In Section II, we introduce our system model for a Sybil
attack to shard-based blockchain. In section III, we present
our analytical results for the probability of a successful Sybil
attack. Section IV presents the simulation results, following
by related work and conclusions in Section V and Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we first briefly outline the operational details
of a shard-based permissionless blockchain system such as
Elastico and then discuss the details of Sybil attacks that may
be possible in such a network.
A. Shard-Based Blockchain Models
The operation of Elastico, and most other shard-based
permissionless blockchain networks, can be fully described
by means of four sequential steps that needs to be executed
in each time period or epoch, as outlined in Figure 1. We
assume that the blockchain network comprises of N nodes
(or processors) with different computational capabilities or
hash-power. This is in contrast with [7] and [6], where it is
assumed that all nodes have the same power. The hash-power,
which specifies the number of hash computations that can be
performed by a node per second, is denoted by h. To elucidate
the presentation, Table I summarizes the symbols (and their
meanings) used throughout the paper.
Similar to any permissionless system, nodes in Elastico do
not have any predefined identity assigned by a trusted third-
party. In the first step of Elastico, as shown in Figure1, each
node attempts to generate a verifiable and pseudorandom ID
which will enable it to participate in the rest of the steps
in that time period or epoch. The nodes use the solution of
a Proof-of-Work (PoW) puzzle with a network-determined
difficulty to decide if they have arrived at a valid ID, as
TABLE I: List of Notations
Symbol Definition
N Number of nodes in the network
N∗ Total required IDs at each epoch (N∗ < N )
M Number of IDs generated by the adversary
ti The time of epoch i
L The length of output of secure hash function (bit)
Lti The length of target value (bit) at epoch ti
c Capacity of each shard
h Hash-power of each processor
s Represent the number of shards (2s)
TI Initialization time needed for ID generations
τ Consensus threshold
x Number of chosen adversary’s IDs (Random Variable)
Dif(ti) Difficulty of solving PoW puzzle at epoch ti
p(ti) The probability of finding a correct ID at epoch ti
P{x = n} The probability of selecting n adversary’s ID
Pc−τ+1 The probability of having at least c− τ + 1 adversary’s
IDs in one shard, if n ∈ (c− τ, c]
P ′c−τ+1 The probability of having at least c− τ + 1 adversary’s
IDs in one shard, if n ∈ (c, 2s(c− τ)]
P ′′c−τ+1 The probability of having at least c− τ + 1 adversary’s
IDs in one shard, if n > 2s(c− τ)
Pτ The probability of having at least τ adversary’s IDs in
one shard, if n ∈ [τ, c]
P ′τ The probability of having at least τ adversary’s IDs in
one shard, if n ∈ (c, 2s(τ − 1)]
P ′′τ The probability of having at least τ adversary’s IDs in
one shard, if n > 2s(τ − 1)
PB The probability of successful BCP attack
PG The probability of successful GFT attack
described next. Let Hash() be the hash function (Elastico
employs SHA− 256) employed by a node in the blockchain
network and let IP and PK denote a node’s network address
and public key, respectively. A publicly-known pseudo-random
string epochRandomness, generated at the end of the previous
epoch of the protocol (to avoid puzzle pre-computation), is
used as a seed for the PoW puzzle. Each node in the first step
of the protocol attempts to solve the PoW puzzle by finding a
nonce such that Hash(epochRandomness||IP ||PK||nonce)
is smaller than some network-determined target value. The
target value which determines the difficulty of the PoW puzzle
is adapted by the network during each epoch based on the
network-wide hash-power. Let’s denote the target by Lti bits,
where L is the size of the message digest (in terms of bits)
and ti is corresponding the time epoch. In other words, a
valid ID value during epoch ti must be smaller than 2L
ti and
a node successful in generating such a valid ID assumes it
as its own ID during the later steps of the the protocol. It
should be noted that all nodes must generate their ID during
a given initialization time TI , defined by the protocol. If they
cannot solve the puzzle within this time, they will not possess
a valid ID to join the rest of the network and participate in
the protocol. It should be clear that nodes with a higher hash-
power have a higher probability of solving the ID generation
PoW puzzle and thus participating in the protocol, compared
to nodes with lower hash-power.
After ID generation, in step 2 the generated node IDs
and distributed transactions (which may contain both valid
and fake/invalid transactions) are randomly distributed (or
partitioned) into different shards or committees for validation.
In Elastico, there exist a total of 2s shards, where s is a
network-defined parameter. Each node will be placed in a
shard according to the last s bits of its ID. If the capacity of
each shard is denoted by c, then it is clear that the minimum
number of valid IDs required to execute a single epoch (all
steps) of a shard-based blockchain protocol such as Elastico is
N∗ = 2s× c. The processors discover IDs of other processors
in their shard by communicating with each other.
In the third step, processors of each shard simultaneously
validate the transaction set assigned to that shard and agree on
a consensus transaction set (within that shard) using the PBFT
[9] and [11] algorithm. Let τ denote the consensus threshold
for each shard, i.e., if at least τ processors in a shard agree on
a transaction set, then consensus within the shard is successful
and the consensus transaction set is added to the shard’s
output. In other words, the consensus protocol within a shard
successfully outputs a valid consensus transaction set even if
c− τ nodes within the shard do not cooperate and/or behave
maliciously. In Figure 1, we see this case in Shards 2 and
n− 1. Post the intra-shard consensus, the leader node within
each shard sends the signed value of the consensus transaction
set, along with the signatures of the contributing shard nodes,
to a final consensus committee (step 4). The final committee
of processors, chosen based on their ID, merges the consensus
transaction sets from each shard to create a final block which
is eventually appended to the blockchain. Each final committee
member first validates that the values (consensus transaction
sets) received from each shard is signed by at least c/2 + 1
members of the shard, and then computes the ordered set union
of all inputs. Finally, nodes of final committee execute PBFT
to determine the consensus final block, which is signed and
gets appended as the next block to the blockchain.
B. Threat Model
We assume that the adversary or attacker (A) in this setup
has enough hash-power to generate more than one IDs (during
step 1, as outlined above) and attempts to launch a Sybil attack
to disrupt the operation of the shard-based blockchain protocol.
Although we formally model adversarial capabilities assuming
a shard-based blockchain protocol such as Elastico, the model
(and the results) can easily be generalized to other shard-
based protocols. Before outlining the specific Sybil attacks that
could be carried out by the adversary, let us first characterize
the difficulty of an adversary in generating Sybil nodes. As
outlined earlier, each node or processor uses the solution of
a PoW puzzle as an ID such that in epoch ti the selected
ID must be smaller than some network-agreed target value
2L
ti . Let MaxTarget denote the maximum possible value
of the target. As MaxTarget is observed in the first epoch,
MaxTarget = 2L
t1 (e.g., in Bitcoin MaxTarget = 2224
[12]). Given MaxTarget, we define the difficulty of solving
a PoW puzzle in epoch ti as:
Dif(ti) =
MaxTarget
2L
ti
. (1)
It is easy to see that, as the target value 2L
ti during a particular
time epoch ti reduces, the PoW puzzle for ID computation
becomes harder to solve for the nodes or processors, which
is indicated by a higher difficulty value Dif(ti). Now, the
probability of finding a valid ID during epoch ti is given by:
p(ti) =
2L
ti
2L
. (2)
where 2L denotes the message digest space of the hash
function Hash() using the PoW puzzle. Given Equation (1),
p(ti) can be rewritten as:
p(ti) =
2L
t1
Dif(ti)
2L
=
2L
t1
Dif(ti)× 2L . (3)
Equation (3) above represents the formal relationship between
the difficulty of finding a valid PoW puzzle solution (i.e., ID
in this case) and the success probability of solving the puzzle
during epoch ti. Now, let us assume that the adversary A’s
hash-power (or hash computation capability) is hA. In other
words, during the initialization period TI (step 1) of an epoch
ti, A can generate a maximum of hA×TI potential solutions
(or message digests), of which only those that smaller than
2L
ti (target value during ti) can be used as valid IDs. Let’s
further assume that A can find M valid solutions or IDs (i.e.,
those that satisfy the puzzle or are within the target value)
during TI . Thus, M can be calculated by:
M = p(ti)× hA × TI . (4)
Substituting for p(ti) from Equation (3) we get:
M =
2L
t1
Dif(ti)× 2L × h
A × TI . (5)
Now, a PoW puzzle based identity or ID generation mech-
anism is said to be strictly Sybil-resistant if and only if the
value of M in the mechanism can be restricted to less than
2. In other words, for the above PoW puzzle based identity
or ID generation mechanism in Elastico to be strictly Sybil-
resistant, the solution difficulty Dif(.) and initialization time
TI should be such that for a given adversary hash-power hA,
L, and Lt1 , M is always smaller than 2, i.e., A should be
able to generate at most one ID during TI . In this paper, we
assume that the shard-based blockchain protocol’s PoW-based
identity generation mechanism is not strictly Sybil-resistant
and that the adversary’s hash-power is large enough to generate
two or more than IDs (i.e., M ≥ 2) during the initialization
phase (step 1) of any epoch. The adversary then employs these
numerous valid IDs for placing itself in multiple shards in
order to carry out different types Sybil attacks (as described
below), the goal of which is to subvert the correct operation
of the blockchain protocol. In contrast to the adversary, we
assume that each honest node in the network generates only
a single valid ID during TI in each epoch. Now, lets describe
in further details the two different types of Sybil attacks that
can be carried out by the adversary.
1. Break Consensus Protocol (BCP) Attack: In order to
accomplish the BCP attack, the goal of which is to disrupt
the shard-based consensus process, the adversary will need
to generate more than c − τ valid IDs in a (target) shard.
This threshold of valid IDs will enable the adversary to
break the intra-shard consensus protocol in that shard, thereby
preventing insertion of some transactions (specifically, from
the target shard) into the blockchain. An instance of the BCP
attack is depicted in Figure 1, where the attacker successfully
inserts more than c− τ Sybil IDs in Shard 1.
2. Generate Fake Transaction (GFT) Attack: In order to
accomplish the GFT attack, the goal of which is to include
fake (including, double spending or invalid) transactions in
the blockchain blocks by taking over the consensus process,
the adversary will need to add at least τ valid IDs in a
(target) shard. By doing so, the adversary aims to control and
manipulate the consensus process (i.e., the PBFT algorithm)
using his Sybil IDs so that intra-shard consensus could be
arrived on a desired set of fake transactions, which eventually
get inserted into the blockchain block after final consensus.
Figure 1 illustrates the GFT attack on shard k.
Our overarching goal is to determine bounds on the success
probabilities, given different network and protocol parameters,
of carrying out the BCP and GFT Sybil attacks described
above. In the following section, we present theoretical analysis
outlining the computation of these probability bounds.
III. ANALYTICAL RESULTS
The remaining operations (step 2 onward) of the shard-
based blockchain protocol are initiated in each epoch only
after receiving N∗ IDs from the ID pool generated during
the initialization or identifier generation phase (step 1), as
discussed earlier in Section II. Now, given the M Sybil IDs
(generated by the adversary) in the ID pool comprising of a
total of M + N − 1 IDs, our first task is analyze this ID
selection. Let x denote a random variable representing the
number of Sybil IDs (generated by the adversary) chosen from
the M + N − 1 IDs generated during the initialization step
(step 1). In other words, x IDs belonging to the adversary
while N∗−x IDs belonging to the honest nodes are distributed
among the various shards after the initialization period TI (step
1). The success probability of the various attacks described
above is thus a function of the number of Sybil IDs that
the adversary is able to generate and get distributed among
the different shards in each epoch. From the discussion in
Section II-B, it should be clear that if the number of Sybil
IDs generated by an adversary is smaller than or equal to
c − τ , then the adversary cannot successfully execute the
BCP or GFT attacks. Let n denote the actual number of
Sybil IDs chosen to be distributed among the various shards,
i.e., n ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,M}. Thus, we first need to calculate the
probability P{x = n} of selecting/choosing n Sybil IDs or
nodes from the entire pool of M + N − 1 IDs in an epoch.
This is given by the following Lemma.
Lemma 1. If A can generate M Sybil IDs during TI , then
the probability of selecting n Sybil IDs from the ID pool is
P{x = n} =
(
M
n
)(
N−1
N∗−n
)(
M+N−1
N∗
) .
Proof. The proof of this lemma follows trivially from the fact
that x follows a hypergeometric distribution [13].
The following subsections will be devoted to the computa-
tion of the adversary’s success probability in executing BCP
and GFT Sybil attacks. Recall that Table I summarizes the
definition of main probability bounds.
A. Probability of Successful BCP Attack
Recall that for successfully executing the BCP attack, A
must have more than c− τ (Sybil) IDs in at least one shard.
Hence, if M ≤ c− τ , A cannot launch BCP attacks, i.e., the
probability of a successful BCP attack would be zero. Thus, to
calculate the successful probability of a BCP attack, we first
need to calculate the probability of having at least c − τ + 1
Sybil IDs in one shard, when x = n Sybil IDs (generated by
the adversary A) have been chosen from the overall ID pool
(at the end of the initialization step). The following lemma
captures this probability.
Lemma 2. In a shard-based blockchain protocol, when n Sybil
IDs (generated by the adversary A) have been chosen from the
ID pool after the initialization step, the probability of having
at least c− τ + 1 Sybil IDs in one shard is:
Pc−τ+1 =
2s
n∑
m=c−τ+1
(
n
m
)(
N∗−n
c−m
)
(
N∗
c
) .
where c− τ + 1 ≤ n.
Proof. Given the number of shards (i.e., 2s), the capacity of
each shard (i.e., c), and the total number of selected IDs (i.e.,
N∗) the sample space and the space of the desirable event
(i.e., having at least c− τ +1 Sybil IDs in one shard) will be:
n(S) =
(N∗
c
)(N∗ − c
c
)
...
(c
c
)
=
N∗!
c!c!...c!
=
N∗!
c!2
s . (6)
n(E) =2s
( n
c− τ + 1
)(N∗ − n
τ − 1
)(N∗ − c
c
)
..
(c
c
)
+ 2s
( n
c− τ + 2
)(N∗ − n
τ − 2
)(T − c
c
)
..
(c
c
)
+ ...+ 2s
(n
n
)(N∗ − n
c− n
)(N∗ − c
c
)
..
(c
c
)
.
(7)
The probability Pc−τ+1 can then be computed by:
Pc−τ+1 =
n(E)
n(S)
=
2s
n∑
m=c−τ+1
(n
m
)(N∗−n
c−m
)
(N∗
c
) .
Please note that the above closed-form solution is correct if
n ≤ c. But for the values of n bigger than c we cannot employ
the same calculation and deriving a closed-form solution was
not possible. In the following analysis we employ numerical
analysis to obtain these values, and we leave this derivation
for our future work. The following theorem calculates the
successful probability of BCP attack, when the number of
Sybil IDs is smaller than or equal to c.
Theorem 1. In a shard-based blockchain protocol, when the
number of Sybil IDs (generated by the adversary A) is smaller
than or equal to c and greater than c − τ , the probability of
a successful BCP attack in at least one shard is:
PB =
2s
M∑
n=c−τ+1
n∑
m=c−τ+1
(
M
n
)(
N−1
N∗−n
)(
n
m
)(
N∗−n
c−m
)
(
M+N−1
N∗
)(
N∗
c
) . (8)
Proof. The probability of a successful BCP attack in at least
one shard can be computed as:
PB = P{x = c− τ + 1}Pc−τ+1 + P{x = c− τ + 2}Pc−τ+1
+ ...+ P{x =M}Pc−τ+1 = (
M∑
n=c−τ+1
P{x = n})Pc−τ+1.
(9)
Given Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, we can rewrite PB by:
PB = (
M∑
n=c−τ+1
(M
n
)( N−1
N∗−n
)
(M+N−1
N∗
) )( 2
s
n∑
m=c−τ+1
(n
m
)(N∗−n
c−m
)
(N∗
c
) )
=
2s
M∑
n=c−τ+1
n∑
m=c−τ+1
(M
n
)( N−1
N∗−n
)(n
m
)(N∗−n
c−m
)
(M+N−1
N∗
)(N∗
c
) .
Having computed this probability, we now attempt to de-
termine the impact of different shard-based blockchain system
design parameters on the robustness against such Sybil attacks.
In the following two theorems, we present similar success
probability estimations for higher values of M .
Theorem 2. In a shard-based blockchain protocol, when the
number of Sybil IDs (generated by the adversary A) is smaller
than or equal to 2s(c− τ) and greater than c, the probability
of a successful BCP attack in at least one shard is:
PB =
2s
c∑
n=c−τ+1
n∑
m=c−τ+1
(M
n
)( N−1
N∗−n
)(n
m
)(N∗−n
c−m
)
(M+N−1
N∗
)(N∗
c
)
+
M∑
n=c+1
(M
n
)( N−1
N∗−n
)
(M+N−1
N∗
) P ′c−τ+1.
(10)
Proof. Similar to the proof of Theorem 1, this probability can
be calculated by:
PB = (
c∑
n=c−τ+1
P{x = n})Pc−τ+1 + (
M∑
n=c+1
P{x = n})P ′c−τ+1.
And we can replace Pc−τ+1 to find the probability of
successful attack by:
PB =
2s
c∑
n=c−τ+1
n∑
m=c−τ+1
(M
n
)( N−1
N∗−n
)(n
m
)(N∗−n
c−m
)
(M+N−1
N∗
)(N∗
c
)
+
M∑
n=c+1
(M
n
)( N−1
N∗−n
)
(M+N−1
N∗
) P ′c−τ+1.
Theorem 3. In a shard-based blockchain protocol, when the
number of Sybil IDs (generated by the adversary A) is greater
than 2s(c− τ), the probability of a successful BCP attack in
at least one shard is:
PB =
2s
c∑
n=c−τ+1
n∑
m=c−τ+1
(
M
n
)(
N−1
N∗−n
)(
n
m
)(
N∗−n
c−m
)
(
M+N−1
N∗
)(
N∗
c
)
+
2s(c−τ)∑
n=c+1
(
M
n
)(
N−1
N∗−n
)
(
M+N−1
N∗
) P ′c−τ+1 +
min(M,N∗)∑
n=2s(c−τ)+1
(
M
n
)(
N−1
N∗−n
)
(
M+N−1
N∗
) .
(11)
Proof. Similar to earlier proofs, we can compute this proba-
bility by:
PB = (
c∑
n=c−τ+1
P{x = n})Pc−τ+1 + (
2s(c−τ)∑
n=c+1
P{x = n})P ′c−τ+1
+ (
min(M,N∗)∑
n=2S(c−τ)+1
P{x = n})P ′′c−τ+1.
(12)
Since n > 2s(c − τ), c − τ Sybil IDs (generated by the
adversary) will definitely reside in each shard. In other words,
given the total number of Sybil IDs generated by the adversary,
at least c − τ + 1 of these IDs will be placed in at least one
shard. When this happens, A can compromise the consensus
protocol of this shard with probability 1. So P ′′c−τ+1 = 1.
Moreover based on Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, Equation (12)
can be rewritten as:
PB =
2s
c∑
n=c−τ+1
n∑
m=c−τ+1
(M
n
)( N−1
N∗−n
)(n
m
)(N∗−n
c−m
)
(M+N−1
N∗
)(N∗
c
)
+
2s(c−τ)∑
n=c+1
(M
n
)( N−1
N∗−n
)
(M+N−1
N∗
) P ′c−τ+1 +
min(M,N∗)∑
n=2s(c−τ)+1
(M
n
)( N−1
N∗−n
)
(M+N−1
N∗
) .
In the following, we will similarly analyze the success
probability of an adversary in executing the GFT attack.
B. Probability of a Successful GFT Attack
In GFT attack, A would like to change the output of at
least one shard, and insert his favorite transactions in the
blockchain. The calculation of successful probability of this
attack is similar to the previous section (i.e., BCP attack), but
the number of required Sybil IDs is different. In this attack,
A must have more than τ Sybil IDs in at least one shard.
Hence, if M < τ , the adversary cannot successfully execute
the GFT attacks (i.e., probability of success is zero). In order
to estimate the success probability of an adversary in carrying
out GFT attacks, we first need to calculate the probability of
having at least τ Sybil IDs in one shard, when a total of x = n
Sybil IDs (generated by the adversary) have been chosen from
the pool of all generated IDs (during the initialization step).
The following lemma calculates this probability.
Lemma 3. In a shard-based blockchain protocol, when n
Sybil IDs (generated by the adversary A) have been chosen
or selected from the ID pool after the initialization step, the
probability of having at least τ Sybil IDs in one shard is:
Pτ =
2s
n∑
m=τ
(
n
m
)(
N∗−n
c−m
)
(
N∗
c
) .
where τ ≤ n.
Proof. According to the Lemma 2, the sample space is equal
to Equation (6). Similarly, by considering all possible com-
binations of Sybil ID distributions within the shards, we can
compute the space of the desirable event (i.e., having at least
τ Sybil IDs in one shard) by:
n(E) =2s
(n
τ
)(N∗ − n
c− τ
)(N∗ − c
c
)
..
(c
c
)
+ 2s
( n
τ + 1
)( N∗ − n
c− τ − 1
)(N∗ − c
c
)
..
(c
c
)
+ ...+ 2s
(n
n
)(N∗ − n
c− n
)(N∗ − c
c
)
..
(c
c
)
The probability Pτ can then be computed by taking the ratio
of the event space to the sample space as:
Pτ =
n(E)
n(S)
=
2s
n∑
m=τ
(
n
m
)(
N∗−n
c−m
)
(
N∗
c
) . (13)
Similar to BCP attack, the above closed-form solution is
correct if n ≤ c. Finding a closed-form solution for the case
where n > c is a part of our future challenges. The following
theorem calculates the successful probability of GFT attack,
when the number of Sybil IDs is smaller than or equal to c.
Theorem 4. In a shard-based blockchain protocol, when the
number of Sybil IDs (generated by the adversary A) is smaller
than or equal to c and greater than τ − 1, the probability of
a successful GFT attack in at least one shard is:
PG =
2s
M∑
n=τ
n∑
m=τ
(
M
n
)(
N−1
N∗−n
)(
n
m
)(
N∗−n
c−m
)
(
M+N−1
N∗
)(
N∗
c
) . (14)
Proof. This probability can be computed similar to the proof
of Theorem 1 as:
PG = (
M∑
n=τ
P{x = n})Pτ . (15)
Based on Lemma 1 and Lemma 3, Equation (15) can be
rewritten as:
PG = (
M∑
n=τ
(M
n
)( N−1
N∗−n
)
(M+N−1
N∗
) )( 2s
n∑
m=τ
(n
m
)(N∗−n
c−m
)
(N∗
c
) )
=
2s
M∑
n=τ
n∑
m=τ
(M
n
)( N−1
N∗−n
)(n
m
)(N∗−n
c−m
)
(M+N−1
N∗
)(N∗
c
) .
Having computed this probability, we now attempt to de-
termine the impact of different shard-based blockchain system
design parameters on the robustness against such Sybil-based
GFT attacks. In the following two theorems, we present similar
success probability estimations for higher values of M .
Theorem 5. In a shard-based blockchain protocol, when the
number of Sybil IDs (generated by the adversary A) is smaller
than or equal to 2s(τ − 1) and greater than c, the probability
of a successful GFT attack in at least one shard is:
PG =
2s
c∑
n=τ
n∑
m=τ
(M
n
)( N−1
N∗−n
)(n
m
)(N∗−n
c−m
)
(M+N−1
N∗
)(N∗
c
) +
M∑
n=c+1
(M
n
)( N−1
N∗−n
)
(M+N−1
N∗
) P ′τ .
(16)
Proof. Similar to the proof of Theorem 4, this probability can
be calculated by:
PG = (
c∑
n=τ
P{x = n})Pτ + (
M∑
n=c+1
P{x = n})P ′τ .
It is then easy to show that PG is derived by Equation (16).
Theorem 6. In a shard-based blockchain protocol, when the
number of Sybil IDs (generated by the adversary A) is greater
than 2s(τ − 1), the probability of a successful GFT attack in
at least one shard is:
PG =
2s
c∑
n=τ
n∑
m=τ
(M
n
)( N−1
N∗−n
)(n
m
)(N∗−n
c−m
)
(M+N−1
N∗
)(N∗
c
) +
2s(τ−1)∑
n=c+1
(M
n
)( N−1
N∗−n
)
(M+N−1
N∗
) P ′τ
+
min(M,N∗)∑
n=2s(τ−1)+1
(M
n
)( N−1
N∗−n
)
(M+N−1
N∗
) .
(17)
Proof. Similarly, the probability of a successful GFT attack
can be computed as:
PG = (
c∑
n=τ
P{x = n})Pτ + (
2s(τ−1)∑
n=c+1
P{x = n})P ′τ
+ (
min(M,N∗)∑
n=2s(τ−1)+1
P{x = n})P ′′τ .
(18)
Since n > 2s(τ − 1), τ − 1 Sybil IDs (generated by the
adversary) will definitely reside in each shard. In other words,
given the total number of Sybil IDs generated by the adversary,
at least τ of these IDs will be placed in at least one shard.
When this happens, A can compromise the PBFT consensus
protocol to change the output produced by this shard with
probability 1. So P ′′τ = 1 and we can rewrite Equation (18)
as shown by Equation (17).
In the following section, we will verify our closed-form
solutions with the help of numerical simulations.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND MODEL VERIFICATIONS
We validate the correctness of our analytical results dis-
cussed earlier by conducting extensive numerical simulations
as outlined next. We implement a Python-based simulator for
Elastico [6] and simulate the BCP and GFT Sybil attacks by
considering an adversary with different hash-powers. Success
probabilities of these BCP and GFT attacks during simulations
is computed and compared with our previous determined
analytical results. We investigate the effect of various system
parameters on the success probability of these attacks, includ-
ing, number of shards (i.e., 2s), capacity of each shard (i.e.,
c), total number of participating nodes in the network (i.e., N )
and the threshold for consensus (i.e., τ ).
A. Validation of Analytical Results
We start by considering a small network of 14 participating
nodes (i.e., N = 14) and 4 shards (i.e., s = 2), each with
a capacity of 3 nodes (i.e., c = 3) undergoing a BCP attack
by assuming different adversarial hash-rates. Figure 2a, which
represents the probability of a successful BCP attack under this
simulated scenario, shows that results from our simulations
align very closely to those obtained from our analytical results
(i.e., Theorems 1, 2 and 3). Here, the hash-rate (shown on
the x-axis) is computed as the ratio of the adversary’s hash-
power (A) to the average hash power of the entire network.
Figure 2b shows similar results for a larger network with
parameters N = 200, c = 50, and s = 2. Even in this case,
it can be observed that our analytical results are in line with
the simulated behavior of the Elastico network. We similarly
verify the validity of our analytical results (Theorems 4, 5 and
6) for the GFT attacks. Figure 2c shows the success probability
of the GFT attacks in an Elastico blockchain network with
parameters N = 20, c = 4, and s = 2, and these results
confirm that our analytical computation of these probabilities
was correct. Next, for each attack scenario, we will employ
simulations to demonstrate the impact of different system
parameters on the success probability of the attacks.
B. BCP Numerical Analysis
Figure 3 shows the success probability of BCP attacks for
different hash-powers of the adversary. Figure 3a shows that
the BCP attack probability increases when we increase the
number of shards. In this experiment, the capacity (c) of each
shard is set to 100 (based on Elastico) and the value of τ is
set to 23 . Our results show that an adversary who has 25%
of the hash-power of network can compromise (and manip-
ulate) the consensus algorithm employed by the shard-based
protocol (e.g., PBFT). Figure 3b shows that the probability of
successful BCP attacks decreases when the capacity (c) of each
shard increases. We also evaluated the effect of the number
of active/participating nodes on the probability of successful
BCP attacks. We execute the simulations by setting the shard
capacity (c) to 100, number of shards (s) to 4 and the threshold
value τ to 23 . Results from these simulations show that the
adversary (A) needs to have 33% of the hash-power of whole
network to lunch a successful BCP attack. But accumulating
33% of the network’s hash-power will become more difficult
by increasing the number of total nodes.
Finally, we investigate the effect of τ on the success
probability of BCP attacks. The results are shown in Figure 3d.
We vary the value of τ from 0.52 and 0.75. Our results show
that if the value of τ changes from τ1 to τ2, the adversary
needs about 1 − (τ2 − τ1) hash-power of the previous hash-
power, in order to achieve the same attack success probability
for τ1. For example, if the BCP attack success probability
of an adversary with hash-power HP was PB with τ = 23 ,
then the adversary would need to accumulate a hash-power of
0.91 × HP in order to achieve the same success probability
(PB) with τ = 0.75.
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 2: Our model verification. (a) BCP attack simulations for N = 14 with 4 shards. (b) BCP attack simulation with N = 200
and 4 shards. (c) GFT attack simulation with N = 20 and 4 shards.
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Fig. 3: The effect of (a) number of shards, (b) capacity of shard, (c) number of nodes, and (d) τ on successful BCP attack.
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Fig. 4: The effect of (a) number of shards, (b) shard capacity, (c) number of nodes, and (d) τ on successful GFT attack.
C. GFT Numerical Analysis
Figure 4 shows the success probability of GFT attacks for
different values of the adversary’s hash-power. As shown in
Figure 4a, if the adversary’s hash-power is less than 50%
of the network hash-power, it cannot execute a successful
GFT attack. We also observe that the GFT attack probability
increases when the number of shards increases. Moreover,
Figure 4b shows that shard capacity (c) increases, the GFT
attack success probability decreases. It should be noted that
this trend is observable only when the adversary’s hash-power
is less than 65% of the total network hash-power. If the
adversary has more than 65% of the total network hash-power,
increasing the capacity (c) has no significant impact on PG.
Figure 4c shows the effect of the total number of partici-
pating nodes in the network on the success of the GFT attack.
Our simulation results show that if the adversary holds 65%
of the network’s hash-power, it can successfully perform the
GFT attack when the total number of participating nodes 2000
or less. However, as the total number of participating nodes
increases (e.g., 3000), the success of the GFT attack is not
guaranteed. Figure 4d shows the impact of τ on the success
of GFT attacks. Here we see a similar trend as in the case
of BCP attacks, where with higher values of τ the adversary
needs more hash-power to conduct a successful GFT attack.
Table II summarizes a series of simulation of Sybil attack
with different parameters. The results show that we can avoid
successful GFT and BCP attack with an optimal selection of
number of shards and their capacity even if the adversary’s
hash-power is about 25% of the average hash-power of the
network. But if the adversary’s hash-power is more than
TABLE II: Numerical Evaluation of Sybil attacks.
hA τ #shards c PB PG
25% 2
3
At most 16 At least 600 ≤ 10−4 0
[33%, 53%] 2
3
- - ≥ 0.8 ≤ 0.005
56% 2
3
At most 16 At least 600 1 ≤ 0.001
Above 66% 2
3
- - 1 ≥ 0.75
33%, it can successfully deploy BCP attack. However, with
maximum of 16 shards with capacity of 600, we can decrease
the probability of successful GFT to less than 0.001. We
believe these results can help designers to avoid attacks.
V. RELATED WORK
To put our current research effort in perspective, we
now briefly outline some other efforts in the literature to-
wards improving the scalability and security of permissionless
blockchains. Bitcoin-NG [5] was the first attempt to improve
the transaction throughput of Bitcoin’s consensus protocol
[1] by employing the concept of microblocks. Due to the
significant drawbacks of leader based consensus protocols
such as Bitcoin and Bitcoin-NG, the research community’s
focus shifted to employing committee-based consensus algo-
rithms [14] for permissionless blockchain systems. For in-
stance, Decker et al. [15] proposed one of the first committee-
based consensus protocols, named PeerCensus, followed by
several other proposals [16]–[19] in a similar direction. The
poor scalability of single committee consensus solutions mo-
tivated the design of multiple committee based blockchain
consensus protocols, where the main idea is to split the
pending transaction set among multiple shards, which then
processes these shards in parallel. RSCoin [20] was proposed
as a shard-based blockchain for centrally-banked cryptocurren-
cies, while Elastico [6] was the first fully distributed shard-
based consensus protocol for public blockchains. Recently
proposed shard-based protocols, such as, Omniledger [21] and
Rapidchain [22] attempt to improve upon the scalability and
security guarantees of Elastico, while PolyShard [23] proposes
to employ techniques from the coded computing paradigm
[24] to simultaneously improve transaction throughput, storage
efficiency and security. Recently, several novel approaches for
shard-based consensus protocols for blockchains have also
been proposed [8], [25], [26], and a good review of that various
shard-based blockchain protocols can be found in [27].
In the direction of security-related analysis and securing
shard-based blockchain protocols, Jusik Yun et al. [28] ob-
served that, as the number of validators per-shard in shard-
based blockchain protocols is generally smaller than the num-
ber of validators in traditional single leader-based protocols, it
makes shard-based protocols more vulnerable to 51% attacks.
They then present a novel Trust-Based Shard Distribution
scheme, which distributes the assignment of potential mali-
cious nodes in the network to shards, in order to solve this
problem. The vulnerability of blockchain consensus protocols,
including shard-based protocols, to attacks that employ Sybil
nodes [29] is clear and well-documented [30], [31]. In this
direction, TrustChain [32] proposed a novel Sybil-resistant
algorithm, called NetFlow, which overcomes Sybil attacks in
traditional single leader blockchain architectures by determin-
ing and employing node trustworthiness during the consensus
process. In the first mathematical efforts, researchers in [33]
analyze the security of three shard-based blockchains ( [6], [7]
and [34]). They computed the upper bound for the probability
of increasing the number of malicious nodes for one committee
and so for each epoch using tail inequalities for sums of
bounded hypergeometric and binomial distributions. But they
don’t have any simulation to proof their probability results.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented an analytical model to calculate
the probability of successful Sybil attack to shard-based per-
missionless blockchains. As an example, we modeled Elastico
and defined two types of Sybil attacked, named BCP (Break
Consensus Protocol) and GFT (Generate Fake Transaction).
We showed that we can calculate the probability of successful
attacks given different system parameters, such as number of
shards, the capacity of shards, and the number of nodes in
the blockchain network. The results have been verified with
numerical simulations. We showed that by carefully design
our blockchain network we can avoid Sybil attack. Our results
showed that Elastico is not robust against a Sybil attack, with
an adversary who has 25% hash-power of the network. In this
case the adversary can break the consensus protocol in at least
on shard with probability equal to 0.2.
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